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RYAN M. IRWIN 
 
 
Apartheid on Trial: South West Africa and the  
International Court of Justice, 1960-1966 
 
 
 
Harold Taswell was not a happy man in the summer of 1965.  
As South Africa’s ambassador to the United States, he held 
one of the most important and prestigious positions in the 
Republic’s Office of Foreign Affairs.   However, things 
were not going well.  In August, he presented a less-than-
subtle report to his superiors in Pretoria: ‘Could Paul 
Kruger have avoided war with England and yet retained the 
integrity of the Republic?  Will we be able to avoid an 
armed clash with the United States—or an armed clash with 
the United Nations strongly backed by the United States—and 
still retain our integrity?  There is a parallel between 
the period preceding the Anglo-Boer War and conditions 
prevailing today.  The situation is equally dangerous.’  
He went on to outline the nature of the threats facing 
South Africa.  ‘[P]owerful forces’ in Washington were out 
to ‘goad and provoke [South Africa] into taking some action 
which would give America a face saving excuse for applying 
sanctions against us, for breaking off diplomatic relations 
and finally for armed intervention.’  Framing President 
Lyndon Johnson as a ‘calculating yet quick tempered, 
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impetuous man,’ Taswell further lamented that the American 
President was so committed to racial integration that he 
was ‘push[ing] aside all those who stand in his way . . . 
[even] his own Whites.’  In the ambassador’s words, ‘Our 
policy and his are diametrically opposed.’  And the path 
forward was becoming treacherous: ‘The tougher nut we are 
to crack, the less likely are we to be attacked but we must 
not underestimate the American danger and the tremendous 
military power of this country.  As Oscar Wilde remarked it 
is easy to choose one’s friends but one must be very 
careful in choosing one’s enemies.’1    
Clearly, all was not quiet on the Republic’s Western 
front.  Taswell’s anxiety was palpable, and tied to a 
simple, unavoidable fact—the first phase of the global 
struggle against apartheid was coming rapidly to its 
climax.  Inspired by the political openings of second-wave 
decolonisation, African nationalists had rallied against 
South Africa in the wake of the Sharpeville Massacre in 
1960, creating a coherent political bloc at the United 
Nations that was dedicated to eliminating white racism on 
the African continent.  These efforts deepened and 
accelerated trends that began with first-wave 
decolonization in the late 1940s.  By 1965, Third World 
nationalists had not only driven a wedge between South 
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Africa and its traditional Western allies; they had 
transformed the dynamics of the Cold War.  As one 
journalist observed that year, the apartheid question had 
become ‘symbolic of bigger issues,’ namely whether ‘the 
demands of Bandung’ would influence the nature of global 
power in the postcolonial era.2  Taswell’s apprehensive 
telegram reflected the fears and suspicions of many white 
South Africans as they surveyed these developments in the 
mid-1960s.  The citadel of white redoubt—constructed so 
methodically by South African leaders in the years after 
World War II—was now in the midst of a full-scale 
diplomatic siege.  And former allies like the United States 
could no longer be counted on for moral, economic, or 
political support. 
Historians have approached this complex moment from 
several vantage points.  The majority of scholarship on 
South Africa was written between the 1970s and the early 
1990s, at the height of anti-apartheid activism in the 
United States and Great Britain.  Inspired often by debates 
on disinvestment, this literature was primarily activist in 
its orientation and focused primarily on the economic 
connections between corporations in the United States, 
Great Britain, and South Africa.  Many authors borrowed 
arguments from contemporary protest movements, and blamed 
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the West for insulating the apartheid regime through its 
tacit acceptance of investment in South Africa.3  When 
applied to the world facing Taswell in 1965, the 
limitations of this literature are fairly self-evident.  
Most of these authors are uninterested in developments 
within the National Party and dismissive of tensions 
between South Africa and its Western allies.  Adhering 
almost exclusively to the assumptions of the neo-colonial 
critique, these scholars paint pan-European power in 
monolithic, racist terms and flatten the complexities and 
contradictions of those who rejected white rule in South 
Africa.   
Since the fall of the National Party, scholarship on 
apartheid in the 1960s has grown more diverse.  Among U.S. 
historians, the most notable contributions look at the 
links between the domestic civil rights movement and U.S. 
government policy toward South Africa.  Recent monographs 
by Thomas Borstelmann, Robert Massie, and Mary Dudziak, 
among many others, illustrate how decolonisation 
transformed the boundaries of America’s own racial 
revolution.  Influenced primarily by methodologies of 
social and political history, these contributions often 
frame U.S.-South African relations along an imaginary color 
line that ran from Jim Crow America through the southern 
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part of the African continent.4  Looking through the lens of 
a much different archival record, historians from South 
Africa offer an alternative vision of the period.  For 
many, the most important aspect of the apartheid years was 
local activism by indigenous Africans.  Drawing frequently 
upon narrative themes of resistance, these scholars add 
depth and texture to the historical record, and provide the 
‘New’ South Africa with a usable past to deal with the 
contemporary challenges of racial reconciliation.  Rather 
than highlighting the role of civil rights groups abroad, 
they focus often on exile organisations like the African 
National Congress, as well as subaltern peasants and 
workers in South Africa.5 
My article aims to do something different.  It blends 
multi-archival research with cultural analysis, treating 
the decade after second wave or African decolonisation as a 
global conjuncture when multiple actors competed to shape 
the terms of legitimacy at the international level.6  Using 
the apartheid question as a window on this process, I look 
specifically at how several influential global actors—the 
so-called African bloc, the National Party, and the U.S. 
government—tried to police knowledge about South Africa in 
these years.  During this moment, South Africa’s system of 
institutionalised racial domination came to function as a 
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geopolitical site of contestation, rallying international 
opinions in concrete ways and infusing particular meanings 
into words like security, justice, development, and 
freedom.7  By highlighting the possibilities and limitations 
of change in the years after decolonisation, the debate 
over apartheid offers a unique microcosm of the 
postcolonial moment in the 1960s.  
This article looks at an important turning point in 
this story.  Although downplayed or forgotten by many 
historians, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case 
against South Africa was a transformative event.  My 
analysis examines not only the evolution of the case 
between 1960 and 1966, but also the role it played in the 
larger political chess match between the National Party and 
the African bloc during this period.8  South African 
officials genuinely feared that a negative ruling would 
lead to sanctions or some type of armed conflict before 
1967; African leaders fully expected that a positive ruling 
would reorient the terms of global legitimacy in their 
favor and validate the demands of the global south.  The 
actual verdict delivered by the Court in late July 1966 
surprised both sides and sent shockwaves through the 
international system, redefining the movement against white 
power in southern Africa.  Viewed by many as the most 
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important decision in the Court’s history, the trial offers 
a unique window on how actors in the First and Third Worlds 
conceptualised—and contested—the notion of political order 
in the decade after decolonisation.   
In exploring this story, this article is bound by two 
interlocking arguments.  First, the ICJ case against South 
Africa was political.  The primary aim of the African bloc 
in the early 1960s was to implement sanctions against the 
National Party and lay the foundation for an armed 
intervention of South West Africa.  By the mid-1960s it was 
abundantly obvious that the Security Council—specifically 
the United States and Great Britain—would not accept 
General Assembly resolutions as evidence that South 
Africa’s Mandate over South West Africa was a breach of 
international peace and security.  If the African bloc 
could secure a positive ruling at the International Court, 
it would break the deadlock over these issues and force the 
great powers into action.  In contradistinction, South 
African officials hoped a victory at the Court would 
fragment the international anti-apartheid struggle and 
eliminate the possibility of sanctions by the United 
Nations.  In both scenarios, the case formed the pivot of a 
uniquely political game.   
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At the same time, the ICJ case was about legitimacy.  
Both sides were drawn to the Court because it represented a 
source of unbiased authority in the international system.  
Positioned as the linchpin of America’s multilateral 
postwar political order, the Court systemized and reified 
values for the global community.9  For the African bloc, the 
goal was not only to defeat South Africa, but to do so on 
uniquely postcolonial terms.  By formally delegitimising 
the apartheid system, Africans felt they would translate 
the implications of universal human rights into 
international law and verify the moral power of the 
nonwhite liberation struggle.  The stakes were equally high 
for the National Party.  A victory would not simply 
insulate the government from sanctions and armed 
intervention; it would effectively buttress South Africa’s 
assertion that sovereignty trumped universal equality in 
the postcolonial era.   If anti-apartheid activism could be 
framed as a mere side show in the larger drama between 
liberal capitalism and communism, South Africa would be 
free to reposition itself as the West’s principal ally on 
the African continent.   
When viewed within these frameworks, the ICJ case 
emerges as a watershed moment.  The Court’s verdict was 
delivered during a period of remarkable turmoil in the 
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international system.  Third World nationalists who had 
rallied to the United Nations in the years after 
decolonisation were beginning to lose their faith in the 
organisation by the mid-1960s.  The outcome of the ICJ case 
reflected and reinforced these trends.  It became a 
powerful symbol, dramatising the limitations of change in 
the postcolonial era and foreshadowing future directions in 
the struggle against apartheid in southern Africa. 
 
APARTHEID’S ACHILLES HEEL 
Kenneth Kaunda was an emerging African leader in 1964.  
As the Prime Minister of the most recently liberated nation 
in Africa, he was invited to the semi-annual Conference of 
Non-Aligned Countries in Cairo, Egypt, that autumn to speak 
on behalf of the Zambian people.  His speech to the 
conference centered on one basic theme—now was not the time 
for new looks on Third World issues.10  His speech opened 
with a few words on the continued moral clarity of non-
alignment, then shifted into an extended diatribe on white 
power in southern Africa.  Noting that the ‘forces of 
reaction’ still loomed large over Africa, Kaunda pointed 
specifically to the Republic of South Africa, arguing that 
apartheid would ‘reap the whirlwind of disaster’ if it 
continued to violate ‘reason and the fundamental principles 
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of civilisation and humans rights.’  His solution was 
deceptively straight-forward—a renewed commitment to the 
‘diplomacy of peace.’  White redoubt could only be defeated 
through international action.  ‘We all know that the United 
Nations Organization is the only key to international and 
national security,’ he explained.  ‘[I]t is through the 
strength of the General Assembly that the non-aligned 
nations will be secure until all the powerful nations are 
politically, economically and socially just.’11   
The speech was an important moment in Kaunda’s 
embryonic political career.  Wrapped in the language and 
logic of Third World nationalism, it helped position him to 
succeed Gamal Abdel Nasser as the Secretary General of the 
Non-Aligned Movement.  It also revealed many of the 
assumptions that animated nationalist thought among Third 
World elites in the mid-1960s.  For leaders like Kaunda, 
apartheid was an affront to the very concept of nonwhite 
political liberation.  Since the onset of first-wave 
decolonization in the 1940s, South Africa’s racial policies 
had served as an imaginative foil for much of the 
decolonized world, providing an array of politicians with a 
common enemy at the international level.12  Kaunda’s 
comments showcased how many of these actors conceptualised 
action against the monolith of white redoubt.  The best 
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strategy was not guerilla warfare or aid from communist 
powers but diplomacy at the United Nations.  For Kaunda, 
the numerical superiority of African and Asian countries at 
the General Assembly was significant.  Non-aligned nations 
did not just have a seat at the table; they had the right 
to control the conversation on North-South issues.  They 
had the right to use the U.N. to confront white racism in 
Africa. 
Kaunda’s speech offers an ideal vantage point on the 
international anti-apartheid movement in the years 
surrounding decolonisation.  This was a struggle defined 
not by Western liberals, church leaders, or even civil 
rights groups in the United States, but by nationalists 
from the Third World.  As Frederick Cooper and others 
illustrate, these nationalists adhered to a metanarrative 
that blended modernisation with non-racialism and equated 
national liberation with socio-economic progress.13  By the 
mid-1960s, their fight against apartheid had reached a 
paradoxical crossroads.  On the one hand, postcolonial 
nationalists had successfully forced the United Nations 
Security Council to pass an arms embargo against the 
Nationalist government and connected the question of 
apartheid to the broader constellation of colonial issues 
in Southern Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique.  However, the 
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major prizes—economic sanctions and military intervention—
were still out of reach.  Although the African bloc and its 
allies could pass General Assembly resolutions against 
South Africa with ease and frequency, they found it nearly 
impossible to move the Security Council beyond a position 
of symbolic criticism vis-à-vis apartheid.   
Members of the African bloc understood these 
difficulties well.  In the early 1960s many had hoped the 
General Assembly would push the Security Council past this 
tipping point through article 14 of the United Nations 
Charter, which gave the Assembly the ability to ‘recommend 
measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation . . . 
it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly 
relations between nations.’  African nationalists had 
initially believed that if they demonstrated that South 
Africa was a danger to ‘the maintenance of international 
peace and security,’ the Security Council would be obliged 
to take action under the provisions of chapter VII, which 
outlined the Council’s role in dealing with member-state 
aggression.14  By 1964 it was clear that this would not 
happen.  The United States and Great Britain—with their 
sizeable economic investments in the Republic and positions 
of influence on the Security Council—were simply unwilling 
to accept U.N. General Assembly resolutions or Special 
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Committee reports as proof that South Africa was a direct 
threat to international peace.   
Faced with this impasse, African nationalists shifted 
their strategy.  If progress in the political realm had 
reached its natural boundaries, the alternative was action 
through the system of international law.  Stated plainly, 
the answer was the International Court of Justice.  This 
approach was not entirely unfounded.  U.S. planners, 
inspired by the achievements of the New Deal, had used the 
ideology of liberalism to rationalise America’s 
‘preponderance of power’ in the late 1940s.  The 
international system they created was based not on power 
politics and intimidation, but legal structure and 
multilateralism.15  This framework opened a range of 
pathways for Third World activists in the decade after 
decolonisation and, so long as the great powers were 
committed to this liberal international order, a victory 
against South Africa at the International Court would have 
serious repercussions.  Article 94 of the U.N. Charter 
explicitly bound the Security Council to uphold Court 
judgments.  In the minds of many African strategists, a 
legal victory against apartheid at the Court would put the 
United States and Great Britain in a political checkmate, 
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forcing both countries to choose between concrete action 
against South Africa and a veto in support of Pretoria.   
The Republic’s controversial Mandate over South West 
Africa offered an ideal basis for litigation.  The League 
of Nations had entrusted South Africa with a Class ‘C’ 
Mandate over Germany’s colony following World War I.  In 
theory, this Mandate was to become a United Nations Trust 
Territory after World War II, but South African leaders 
made an aggressive power play in the late 1940s, arguing 
that because the United Nations was not the natural 
successor to the League of Nations the territory no longer 
belonged to the international community.  In their minds, 
there was no transfer of power between the League and the 
U.N.  As such, South West Africa was now sovereign to South 
Africa.  The United Nations responded to this challenge 
methodically, soliciting the views of the International 
Court of Justice in a series of advisory opinions in the 
early 1950s that denounced Pretoria’s actions as insolent 
and unlawful.  However, the Court’s advisory rulings were 
nonbinding and South Africa’s intransigence went largely 
uncontested through the 1950s.16  All the African bloc had 
to do was prove in a contentious hearing that South 
Africa’s Mandate was illegitimate.  The legal basis for 
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action against apartheid would immediately be established 
at the United Nations.   
A victory on this front would be a major 
accomplishment.  With the Rivonia Trials of early 1964 the 
National Party had effectively put to rest the notion that 
it would succumb naturally to internal pressures from the 
African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress 
(PAC).  South Africa, in the words of one journalist, was 
not going to be the ‘next Algeria.’17  Most observers abroad 
were dejected by this turn of events.  ‘South Africa’s 
monolithic police state with all its ramifications of spies 
and informers makes it impossible for organized violence or 
boycotts to be planned,’ lamented one activist at an 
international conference on apartheid in 1965.18  The South 
West Africa Mandate, however, was the chink in the 
seemingly impenetrable armor of white power.  In the mind 
of many African leaders, the region represented ‘the 
Achilles heel of apartheid.’  While the National Party 
could use notions of sovereignty to shield its internal 
policies from international criticism, its position in the 
Mandate territory was tenuous at best.  In the words of one 
African nationalist, South West Africa was not only a 
‘major issue in world politics,’ but also a ‘flashpoint in 
the international struggle against apartheid—involving not 
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only African nations but the great powers as well.’19  
Victory would be more than symbolic.  It would create the 
legal rationale for a roll-back process that stopped only 
at Table Mountain in Cape Town. 
The African bloc announced it would bring litigation 
against the Republic in late 1960.  Although most African 
countries provided resources to pay for trial expenses, 
Ethiopia and Liberia coordinated the effort because they 
had been members of the League of Nations when the Mandate 
was originally conferred on South Africa.  The first hurdle 
of the case was a large one.  The African bloc needed to 
confirm that it had a legal basis to challenge the 
Republic’s policies in South West Africa.  To develop their 
strategy, the Applicants hired a New York-based lawyer with 
extensive experience in the U.S. State Department—Ernest A. 
Gross.  Gross had written extensively on the role of the 
United Nations in promoting international peace and 
justice, and African leaders viewed him as an ideal ally. 
According to Enuga Reddy, a U.N. official who worked 
closely with African leaders in the 1960s, Gross was 
‘chosen as the counsel in the hope that he would influence 
the U.S. Government.’20  The African Group’s aim was not 
just to win the case but to push the United States and 
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Great Britain into the worldwide coalition against 
apartheid. 
Gross approached the job from an equally distinct 
vantage point.  The fifty-four year old liberal lawyer 
viewed the trial as a chance to rectify the growing tension 
between the politics of postcolonialism at the General 
Assembly and the politics of the Cold War at the Security 
Council.  In the vernacular of modern legal theory, he was 
an advocate of ‘transitional justice.’  As historian 
Elizabeth Borgwardt explains, this paradigm embraced ‘an 
alternative way of thinking about the relation of law to 
political transformation,’ treating justice as ‘distinctive 
in times of transition—partial, contingent, and shaped by 
social understandings of prior injustice rather than by 
abstract, idealized conceptions of the rule of law.’21  In 
Gross’s mind, decolonisation represented the major 
transformation of the late twentieth century.  ‘New nations 
explode into being, not like stars in space, but as 
neighbors on a crowded planet,’ he wrote in 1962.  ‘New 
opportunities bring need for corresponding changes in 
process and structure.’  If the history of man was a story 
of ‘endless struggle toward durable peace and a just 
order,’ South Africa was important for one reason—new 
nations emerging on to the world stage viewed apartheid as 
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an impediment to further human progress.  As such, it 
needed to be confronted.22   
Gross explained his mindset on South Africa well 
during an informal lunch with American officials before he 
accepted the African bloc’s job offer in 1960.  According 
to notes of the meeting: 
Gross said the importance of SWA has often been 
overlooked because of the broader problem of 
apartheid in the Union.  In his view the problem 
of South West arose because of apartheid and was 
inextricably tied up with it. . . . [By] using 
South West Africa to bring additional pressure 
against the Union, [the Mandate] might be a 
handle to get at the apartheid question itself.  
He said this gave added emphasis to the question 
of timing and tactics since at some point the 
question of South West Africa and apartheid would 
. . . merge into one effort.23   
This mindset shaped Gross’s strategic approach during the 
initial phase of the case in 1961 and 1962.  As counsel to 
the African bloc, he articulated a two-pronged legal 
assault that cast the situation in wide terms.  The first 
step was proving that the South West Africa Mandate still 
existed.  Drawing heavily upon the Court’s own advisory 
 - 19 - 
opinions, Gross’s initial Memorial asserted that the 
General Assembly had replaced the League Council as the 
primary oversight organisation of the Mandate System.24  
Despite South Africa’s assertions to the contrary, the 
Republic had tacitly accepted the authority of the United 
Nations in 1946 by requesting feedback on whether South 
West Africa could be annexed by Pretoria.  It was only 
after this request was denied that Nationalist leaders fell 
back to the thesis of discontinuity.  According to Gross, 
these points meant the Mandate was still an ‘autonomous 
territory’ with ‘international character.’25  As such, the 
South African government was obliged to provide regular 
reports and petitions to the United Nations and submit to 
the general will of the world community.26  This argument 
was the linchpin of Gross’s case.  If the Court rejected 
the claim that South West Africa was within the basic 
jurisdiction of the United Nations, the Applicant’s case 
would collapse before it even began. 
 The second part of the African bloc’s legal assault 
focused on the terms of the Mandate.  Gross went through 
the original document with methodical care, emphasising how 
the South African government had debased its territorial 
responsibilities and violated the human rights of 
indigenous peoples.  Despite the fact that article 4 of the 
 - 20 - 
Mandate explicitly prohibited the creation of army or navy 
bases in the territory, the Republic had done exactly the 
opposite.  ‘Armoured corps are not normally used for police 
protection or internal security,’ Gross noted with a hint 
of sarcasm in 1961.27  South Africa was deliberately turning 
the territory into a buffer zone for white power, stifling 
local independence movements while ignoring the development 
needs of the people.28   
Human rights questions were featured prominently in 
the Memorial.  Hearkening back to article 2 of the Mandate—
which instructed South Africa to ‘promote to the utmost the 
material and moral well-being and social progress of the 
inhabitants of the territory’—Gross’s legal team provided 
nearly one-hundred pages of self-proclaimed factual 
evidence on the ‘well-being, social progress, and 
development of people in the territory.’29  Their analysis 
constituted a veritable tour d'horizon of Western 
development theory in the early 1960s, and focused on how 
South Africa had retarded the economic growth, 
representative government, citizenship rights, freedom of 
movement, personal security, rights of residence, and 
educational opportunities of people living in South West 
Africa.  The result was a damning portrait of neglect.30   
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The logic undergirding Gross’s legal brief was fairly 
self-evident.  If the Mandate System was built on a ‘sacred 
trust’ between the Mandatory and indigenous people, South 
Africa’s policies of apartheid breached this agreement.  As 
such, the Mandate needed to be revoked.  The New York 
lawyer was modeling Africa’s case on the most prominent 
human rights trial of the twentieth century—the Nuremberg 
Trials.  Like the litigation against Nazi Party leaders in 
the 1940s, his argument centered on the idea that inhumane 
acts committed against civilian populations were indictable 
as ‘crimes against humanity.’  Gross also understood that—
like the Nuremberg Trials—the South West Africa case would 
function as a contest over the meaning of human rights and 
justice in the decolonized world.  It was essential, 
therefore, that his attacks link the Republic’s failures in 
the realm of development with its support of inequality and 
racial separation.31  Progress was simply incompatible with 
apartheid in the postcolonial era.  In his words:   
[T]he Mandatory has not only failed to promote 
‘to the utmost’ the material and moral well-
being, the social progress and the development of 
the people of South West Africa, but it has 
failed to promote such well-being and social 
progress in any significant degree whatever.  To 
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the contrary, the Mandatory has thwarted the 
well-being, the social progress and the 
development of the people of South West Africa 
throughout varied aspects of their lives. . . . 
The grim past and present reality in the 
condition of the ‘Natives’ is unrelieved by 
promise of future amelioration.  The Mandatory 
offers no horizon of hope to the ‘Native’ 
population.32 
This vision of social justice was tied closely to the 
symbolic matrix of Third World nationalism.  Non-indigenous 
governance ispo facto was an inhuman act.  Therefore, it 
followed that political independence—defined literally as 
control of fixed territorial space—formed the gateway to 
economic and social development.  A victory on these terms 
would not only provide the legal basis for concrete action 
against the Republic of South Africa.  It would 
institutionalise the connection between apartheid and moral 
iniquity and establish a fulcrum to reframe global norms 
around postcolonial objectives. 
These stakes were not lost on the Nationalist 
government.  Afrikaner elites combated the global anti-
apartheid movement through a multi-faceted program of 
propaganda, political resistance, and grassroots lobbying 
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during the early 1960s.  Their goal was not to engage 
African nationalists directly in a debate on human rights, 
but to work outside the parameters of the United Nations to 
subtly reframe the nature of the conversation on 
apartheid.33  The National Party’s initial response to the 
Applicant charges at the International Court fit into this 
initiative.  The government put its faith in David P. de 
Villiers, a prominent member of the South African Bar with 
close ties to Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd.   Not 
surprisingly, his philosophical attitudes on international 
law contrasted starkly with Gross’s ‘transitional justice.’  
An ardent political and social conservative, de Villiers 
supported a static vision of global order based on national 
sovereignty and historical tradition.    
In forming South Africa’s response to the Memorial, de 
Villiers’s legal team tried to do an end-run on human 
rights questions by focusing exclusively on the status of 
the South West Africa Mandate.  Their argument unfolded in 
four parts.  Wrapped around a sophisticated interpretation 
of Western contractual law, the first point claimed that 
the Mandate could not be viewed as a binding legal 
agreement because the resolution that created it was termed 
a ‘declaration’ rather than ‘treaty or convention.’34  When 
South Africa refused to recognise the jurisdiction of the 
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United Nations in 1945, it followed that the Mandate ceased 
to exist.35  The second and third points attacked the locus 
standi of Ethiopia and Liberia.  Pushing the boundaries of 
circular logic, South Africa asserted that because no 
country still belonged to the League of Nations, it was 
technically impossible to challenge South Africa’s control 
over South West Africa.  Drawing again on the specific 
language of the Charter, South African lawyers rationalized 
this claim by pointing out that article 7—which outlined 
proper recourse in the case of a dispute over South West 
Africa—did not say that ‘former’ League members could 
challenge the Mandate.  The third point made this argument 
in a slightly different way, speculating that the 
Applicants could not technically have a dispute with South 
Africa anyway because Mandatory powers were answerable only 
to the League as an entity.  Individual states had no 
standing.36  Finally, de Villiers’s team sought to delay the 
litigation, claiming that ‘direct diplomatic intercourse’ 
between the Applicants and South Africa had yet to take 
place.  Previous discussions at the United Nations were 
meaningless because they had been conducted in a ‘charged 
political environment.’  Until the Republic was given ‘a 
real and genuine opportunity to negotiate it can not be 
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said that the dispute is one which cannot be settled by 
negotiation.’37 
 South Africa’s efforts were almost successful.  In a 
narrow eight-to-seven decision just before Christmas 1962, 
the Court accepted the first part of Gross’s argument.  The 
Mandate existed despite the dissolution of the League, and 
Ethiopia and Liberia had the right to challenge South 
Africa’s policies in South West Africa.  As one legal 
scholar explained at the time, the decision symbolically 
indicated that the ‘sacred trust’ would not be ‘allowed to 
go by default and just disappear into thin air.’38  The 
Nationalist government was accountable for its actions in 
South West Africa.  In an opinion that foreshadowed the 
next stage of the legal battle, one prominent judge 
explained that the law was a ‘living phenomenon which 
translates the collective exigencies and necessities of 
each historical moment.’  Noting that the ‘social 
occurrences’ of each era were the most important sources of 
global order, he explained, ‘Law is not just a mental 
abstraction, nor the result of repeated application of 
written jurisprudence, but, rather, a norm of conduct which 
is rooted in social intercourse.’39  The implications were 
obvious—momentum was on the side of Gross’s ‘transitional 
justice.’    
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FROM NUREMBURG TO BROWN 
 For the Nationalist government, the Court’s decision 
constituted just one part of the much larger—and 
universally unfavorable—political landscape of the early 
1960s.  As one South African journalist lamented, the 
Republic’s ‘spiritual place in the world [was] 
disappearing.’40  Indeed, attacks on South Africa were 
coming from several directions.  On the one hand, the 
country’s position in the Western bloc was under fire.  The 
Republic was effectively removed from the British 
Commonwealth in 1961 when it refused to implement non-
racial domestic reforms demanded by Ghana, Nigeria, and 
India, and it was subjected to an arms embargo by the U.N. 
Security Council in mid-1963 when the Kennedy 
administration bowed to the pressure of the so-called Afro-
Asian bloc.  At the same time, South Africa’s position in 
southern Africa was unstable.  As historian Susan Onslow 
demonstrates, the Republic’s relationship with Rhodesia was 
wrought with tension as Ian Smith prepared the country for 
its Unilateral Declaration of Independence.41   
 By the mid-1960s, South Africa stood at a difficult 
crossroads.  In the words of Prime Minister Verwoerd, the 
‘crux of the problem’ was whether being in the ‘good books 
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of world opinion’ mattered as much as ‘ensur[ing] the 
survival of the white race in this country.’42  The answer 
was obvious to most high-ranking government officials—even 
if the consequences were not.  Despite a constant stream of 
propaganda on South Africa’s economic and political 
invulnerability, many officials understood that the 
country’s long-term prospects were entwined intimately with 
the world situation.  According to Foreign Minister Eric H. 
Louw, South Africa could weather criticism from the United 
Nations General Assembly, but the ‘attitude of those 
countries outside the Bandung-Communist combination,’ 
namely the United States and Great Britain, posed a 
‘serious threat’ to South Africa’s continued prosperity.43  
And as one top-secret review admitted, the ‘good-will, aid 
and investment’ of the West was simply ‘more important to 
South Africa than vice versa.’44  With the United States 
embroiled in its own civil rights revolution and the 
apartheid debate sitting at the nexus of postcolonial 
politics at the United Nations, this uneven relationship 
meant trouble for the Republic.45    
It was in this environment that the second phase of 
the ICJ case took on tremendous significance.  Viewed 
widely as an unbiased institution of law, the Court 
provided a forum where values were contested and normalized 
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for the international community.  If the logic undergirding 
Gross’s second argument was accepted by the Court, it was 
entirely possible that attitudes toward South Africa’s 
situation would harden into outright hostility.  As de 
Villiers explained to his superiors after South Africa’s 
legal defeat in 1962, the ICJ case was one of the ‘greatest 
threats facing the Republic.’46  A victory, on the other 
hand, would carry substantial dividends.  If the 
Nationalist government could show that apartheid in South 
West Africa was not a violation of human rights—if it could 
decouple concepts of justice from the nonwhite liberation 
narrative—the government would gain a leverage point to 
reverse trends toward confrontation with the West.  In the 
minds of South African officials, the ICJ case was the 
tipping point in the larger contest over the Republic’s 
future in the Western bloc. 
South Africa’s legal strategy during the second phase 
of the trial was elaborate.  Not surprisingly, de Villiers 
opened his case by rearguing his original claims on the 
nature of the Mandate and U.N. succession.  He sharpened 
the thesis of discontinuity by positing that the Mandate 
was accountable not to a nebulous ‘international community’ 
but to a concrete institution—in this case the League of 
Nations.  Consequently, it was not possible for a wholly 
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different institution to have supervisory powers without 
the Republic’s consent.  The African bloc’s evidence that 
South Africa had given this consent tacitly in 1946 was 
countered with a series of previously undisclosed ‘new 
facts’ that delved deep into the minutiae of the historical 
record, drawing on a constellation of minor points to muddy 
the clarity of Gross’s original argument.47  Recognising 
that the Court had already ruled on this issue in 1962, de 
Villiers tried reframing the Court’s decision as a narrow 
verdict on jurisdiction rather than an expansive judgment 
on the discontinuity thesis.  This assertion was not 
entirely true, but with the Court divided eight-to-seven a 
South African breakthrough was not impossible.  If one 
judge accepted the validity of the Republic’s ‘new facts,’ 
the original basis of the case would have to be 
reconsidered.  And without evidence of consent, Gross could 
be pushed into a corner where he would have to argue that 
the ‘international community’ had boundless supervisory 
powers over nation-states in the world-system.  
The meat of South Africa’s case was its rebuttal of 
the African bloc’s characterization of apartheid in South 
West Africa.  For de Villiers, everything pivoted on 
showing that segregation could not be conflated with 
oppression.  In a brief that totaled over 1,400 pages, his 
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legal team challenged both the factual and conceptual 
accuracy of Gross’s initial Memorial, explaining that 
apartheid did not retard social progress but offered each 
racial group the tools for ‘separate development.’  Far 
from functioning as an agent of race hatred, this program 
allowed South West Africa’s ‘major ethnic groups to achieve 
an increasing measure of self-government and to develop 
toward self-determination in a political and territorial 
entity of its own.’48  The Republic’s rationalisation of its 
approach was twofold.  In defensive terms, South African 
lawyers claimed it was unfair for the white community to 
sacrifice its ‘institutions, its culture [and] its 
heritage’ in the face of a ‘numerically preponderant and 
aggressively nationalistic Bantu population.’49  Drawing on 
popular binaries between civility and barbarism, they 
suggested that South Africa’s demographic and historic 
particularities made multi-racialism a dangerous myth.   
At the same time, de Villiers and his associates cast 
separate development as a positive alternative to the 
‘cultural imperialism’ of ‘European universalism.’  
Rejecting the language of early twentieth-century racial 
thought, South Africa used social science to show that 
ethnic groups were ‘different’ in objective ways and 
deserved the chance to develop in line with their own 
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standards.  Quoting Prime Minister Verwoerd, de Villiers 
asserted that this program was not a byproduct of white 
supremacy, but a practical way to allow groups to live 
‘next to one another as good neighbors and not as people 
who are continually quarrelling over [power].’50  The issue 
was not racism but conservative Christianity.  Apartheid, 
in this depiction, was South Africa’s practical response to 
the Biblical lessons of Babel.51   
On the strength of this framework, de Villiers 
proceeded to reject each accusation of the Applicant’s 
Memorial.   In the economic realm, he asserted that whites 
were more powerful than indigenous people in South West 
Africa because Natives were uninterested in private 
property and modern capitalism.  Drawing on ethnographical 
evidence and expert testimonies, South African lawyers 
suggested that most Africans chose to remain independent of 
the ‘money economy’ because they preferred subsistence 
farming and local trade networks.  Those individuals who 
bucked these trends generally gravitated to regional mining 
industries, where they avoided trade unions because of 
their illiteracy and linguistic diversity.  Framing 
government policy in munificent terms, de Villiers 
suggested that Nationalist officials only represented 
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Natives on labor boards so that their welfare was protected 
from ‘unscrupulous troublemakers.’52   
The same principles applied to the political realm.  
Although Africans were not allowed to participate in white 
political institutions, they were given complete control 
over their local, tribal, and territorial affairs.  The 
Applicant’s suggestion that these Native Reserves—or 
Bantustans—were unfunded and overcrowded was placed next to 
South Africa’s widely publicized Odendaal Report, which 
promised to spend over £75 million on a five-year social 
modernisation program in the territory.  It would probably 
take ‘one-hundred years or more’ to get indigenous people 
ready for full self-determination, but the Nationalist 
government was willing to commit the necessary resources.53   
Finally, in the area of education, South African 
lawyers framed apartheid as an agent of development.  In 
their minds, direct comparisons between white and nonwhite 
education levels were deceptive because African ‘tribes’ 
were so widely opposed to universal European instruction 
standards.  Education was a source of identity and power 
for local groups.  Nationalist officials coupled this point 
with evidence that, despite these barriers, the government 
was able to increase school attendance among African 
children by forty-six percent between 1950 and 1961; a 
 - 33 - 
number which compared favorably to Ethiopia’s five percent 
and Liberia’s twenty-three percent.54  Returning to article 
2 of the Mandate—which instructed the Mandatory to ‘promote 
to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social 
progress of the inhabitants of the territory’—South Africa 
concluded that Gross’s entire case was baseless.  Despite 
hollow assertions to the contrary, apartheid was 
implemented in good faith in South West Africa, proving 
that racial separation was not incompatible with the 
project of development.55 
 To hammer this point home, South Africa made a bold 
move as oral arguments commenced on 30 March 1965.  
Standing before the Court for the first time since 1962, de 
Villiers invited the judges to conduct an on-site 
inspection of South West Africa.  The only condition was 
that they also visit Ethiopia, Liberia, and a former 
Mandate territory like Tanzania.  With this comparative 
understanding of the ‘African reality,’ the Court would be 
better equipped to ‘form a general impression of comparable 
conditions and standards of the material and moral well-
being and social progress of the inhabitants.’56  The 
request was a shrewd tactical maneuver—designed to link 
African problems with racial inferiority rather than 
colonial injustice.  De Villiers understood that Gross was 
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modeling his case on the Nuremberg Trials, and hoped the 
invitation would highlight the flaw which undergirded the 
historical analogy.  The Allied case against Nazi Germany’s 
leadership-class worked because American lawyers could show 
that German policies resulted in the wholesale violation of 
human rights during World War II.  If the Nationalist 
government could prove through concrete, comparative 
evidence that its policies were not resulting in the ends 
alleged by the Applicants, South Africa’s critics—or at 
least the members of the International Court—would be 
forced to reassess the basic charge against apartheid.  The 
National Party’s racial policies certainly stood in 
juxtaposition to trends toward self-determination in the 
Third World.  But that did not necessarily mean apartheid 
was ‘genocide masquerading under the guise of a civilized 
dispensation of justice.’57   
The gamble paid off.  Gross’s legal team was surprised 
by the South African move.  Stridently refusing to accept 
the proposal, the Applicants claimed that such a trip would 
sap the Court’s resources and unnecessarily extend the 
trial.  It was ‘unnecessary, expensive, dilatory, 
cumbersome and unwarranted.’58  However, as some observers 
pointed out at the time, 59 Gross’s declarations masked the 
fact that de Villiers had placed the African bloc’s lawyers 
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in a genuine catch-22.  Without tangible evidence of 
oppression in South West Africa, the case against apartheid 
lacked substance and depth.  But to obtain concrete 
evidence of oppression, members of the African bloc would 
have to open their own internal policies to scrutiny and 
examination.  In essence, de Villiers was asking his 
opponents to move their charges from the realm of rhetoric 
into the world of reality.  If the Court went through with 
the trip and supported South Africa’s argument, the 
rationale of the Third World’s international political 
program—in particular the argument that political 
liberation formed the gateway to economic development—would 
be discredited.  In de Villiers’ own words, the dilemma was 
‘unenviable.’60  
Gross responded by moving the case to purely 
theoretical grounds.  Although he intended to 
systematically challenge each point of South Africa’s 
Counter-Memorial, he announced in early April that the 
Republic’s entire brief had been ‘immaterial.’61  The issue 
was no longer oppression in South West Africa, but the fact 
that the South African government’s policies violated the 
‘international human rights norm of non-discrimination or 
non-separation.’62  According to Gross, this norm was 
created by the United Nations Charter and the Universal 
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Declaration of Human Rights and solidified in the early 
1960s with the General Assembly’s Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.63  
Although it did not explicitly trump South Africa’s 
national sovereignty, it gave ‘specific and objective’ 
meaning to international agreements like the Mandate and 
bound international organizations such as the United 
Nations to certain forms of behavior.64   The implications 
were self-evident when applied to the South West Africa 
case.  Article 2 could not be upheld without a parallel 
commitment to non-discrimination and non-separation.  As 
one legal expert explained at the time, ‘The sole issue 
[now] was the existence of an international legal norm 
which absolutely and categorically prohibited apartheid.  
Neither South Africa’s motives in instituting apartheid in 
South West Africa, nor the effects of that policy on the 
territory’s inhabitants were now at issue.’65  In Gross’s 
mind, the ball was back in South Africa’s court. 
However, this line of reasoning dramatically changed 
the rules of the game.  Gross was now modeling the African 
bloc’s case not on the Nuremberg Trials, but on America’s 
own Brown v. Board of Education.  Because ‘separation [was] 
inherently unequal’ it followed that apartheid 
automatically suppressed human rights in South West Africa, 
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irrespective of the evidence presented by the Nationalist 
government.66  Linking this situation directly to U.S. 
domestic law, Gross argued, ‘The Respondent’s policy of 
racial segregation in . . . the Territory is even more 
affirmative, explicit and far-reaching than the racial bar 
struck down by the Brown decision.’67  And if the United 
States government—the most powerful political entity of the 
postwar era—was willing to support the norm of non-
discrimination, it followed that the Court would have to 
deliver a judgment against racial separation in South West 
Africa.   
Gross was getting to the same end—the incongruity of 
apartheid and development—through different means.  During 
the initial phase of the trial, the African bloc’s case 
pivoted on the idea that apartheid was illegitimate because 
it impeded the development of local South West Africans in 
tangible and observable ways.  This argument did not 
fundamentally change during the second phase of the trial, 
but the emphasis shifted from local dynamics to 
international structure.  In very natural ways, the raison 
d'être of the African position came to the forefront.  The 
case was as much about legitimizing postcolonial discourse 
as it was about the intrinsic morality of events in South 
West Africa; apartheid was significant not only because it 
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oppressed black South Africans but because it held symbolic 
importance at the international level.  Through its 
theoretical sophistication and political intransigence, 
apartheid challenged the very idea that history was moving 
linearly toward a political order based on nonwhite 
liberation, human rights, and economic development.  And 
faith in this narrative, in many ways, was the source of 
the Third World’s power in the first decade after 
decolonisation.  By reframing the charge against the 
Nationalist Party around the global norm of non-
discrimination, the Applicants sought not only to 
invalidate the logic and rationale of South Africa’s 
policies, but also to reify the authority and prestige of 
the Third World’s political agenda.  
This shift was a huge leap for the Court.  Beyond the 
basic quandary of whether one sovereign’s domestic law had 
universal, transnational value was an even greater 
question: Was there a single moral system for the world?  
Gross felt that if he could convince the Court that such a 
system existed, he would obtain a favorable ruling on 
apartheid in South West Africa.  Even more, a positive 
judgment on these terms would institutionalise a new 
balance between traditional ‘European’ notions of global 
order—based on the restrictive concept of national 
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sovereignty—and an emerging ‘postcolonial’ vision of power 
based on universal human rights.  The implications of the 
argument were extraordinary.  But, as de Villiers had 
envisioned, the Applicant case now rested on tenuous, 
uncharted ground.  Did the ‘international community’ truly 
have boundless supervisory powers over nation-states in the 
world-system? 
 
HISTORICAL INEVITABILITIES 
 This contest did not unfold in a vacuum.  Put plainly, 
litigation at International Court mattered because 
Washington was listening.  Having created the basic 
scaffolding of the postwar international system, the United 
States gave life to notions of transnational law and 
enforced the Court’s authority at the United Nations 
Security Council.  U.S. leaders may not have been 
emotionally vested in the issues discussed at The Hague, 
but American attitudes nonetheless shaped the lines around 
what was politically possible in the outside world.68 
U.S. policy toward apartheid was conflicted in the 
1960s.  On the one hand, the State Department tended to 
treat the National Party as a political and propaganda 
liability.  With the creation of the African Bureau in the 
late 1950s, liberals such as G. Mennen Williams and Arthur 
 - 40 - 
Goldberg obtained an institutional platform to push the 
United States toward confrontation with the Republic.  Like 
Third World nationalists and South African officials, they 
often couched their goals in the language of development, 
subtly equating Africa’s aspirations with America’s own 
commitment to ‘democratic principles, interracial society 
and human welfare.’  These individuals did not see the same 
linkages as African leaders like Kaunda, but they generally 
accepted a progressive vision of history and social 
justice.69  Apartheid was significant, in this regard, 
because it distracted Third World leaders from the benefits 
of Great Society liberalism and pushed the region into an 
unnecessarily combative anti-Western stance.70  Robert 
Komer, the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs, framed these fears well in 
November 1965, saying that if America failed to back the 
anti-apartheid movement it would be viewed as opposing the 
‘historically inevitable’ rise of African majority rule.71   
Few members of the State Department equated support for 
African nationalism with an armed intervention against 
South Africa, but many felt sanctions against the National 
Party would eventually become unavoidable.72   
In contradistinction, the Pentagon, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and Central Intelligence Agency tended to frame the 
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Nationalist government as America’s main ally in Africa.  
Placing precedence on concrete U.S. interests in the 
region—namely a NASA tracking station and over $600 million 
worth of private investment—they consistently castigated 
the ‘radicalism’ percolating through the State Department.  
Maxwell Taylor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
put it best, ‘As long as communist penetration and racial 
discord in Africa remain an active threat to Free World 
interests, stability in South Africa is desirable and the 
United States should do everything that its political and 
moral position permits to contribute to this.’73  Self-rule 
in the Third World might have been historically inevitable, 
but that did not negate U.S. national security interests or 
lessen the dangers of the Cold War.   
In the mid-1960s, President Johnson generally sided 
with the State Department.  ‘I feel that the prime 
determinant of U.S. influence in Africa will be the stance 
the U.S. takes on those political issues of primary concern 
to the Africans themselves,’ he explained in a private memo 
to Secretary of State Dean Rusk in November 1965.  ‘U.S. 
concern for African problems must be demonstrated by 
actions, and in terms, which will have an immediate appeal 
to the people of Africa.’74  The result was a foreign policy 
that tilted toward confrontation with South Africa.  
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Although a workable solution was admittedly ‘difficult to 
identify,’ the U.S. national policy review on the Republic—
deemed ‘comprehensive’ and ‘authoritative’ by the Johnson 
administration—nonetheless opened with the declaration that 
the ‘status quo’ needed to be overturned in the region.  
The authors presented a conceptual map that mirrored the 
African bloc’s own understanding of the situation.  While 
the rest of the world was ‘moving fast in one direction,’ 
the South African government was ‘moving fast in the 
opposite direction.’  And with the United States’ own 
racial situation ‘in an acute stage of resolution,’ a tepid 
approach toward apartheid was no longer acceptable.75   
However, opposition to South Africa did not 
automatically mean support for the African bloc at the 
United Nations.  As historian Tim Borstelmann and others 
highlight, Johnson viewed himself first and foremost as a 
‘moderate man of the political center.’76  His decision to 
confront South Africa was driven not by genuine moral 
concerns with apartheid, but by an overriding desire to co-
opt the energies of black and white extremism at home and 
abroad.  The question was one of control.  Like any power 
structure, the liberal international order constructed by 
U.S. leaders in the late 1940s functioned because member-
states around the world tacitly invested in its authority.  
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Apartheid challenged this balance in two interlocking ways.  
Most obviously, it distracted attention from America’s own 
goals and obfuscated the moral primacy of liberal 
internationalism.  On a deeper level, however, South 
Africa’s refusal to adjust its policies in the face of 
General Assembly criticism—and the Security Council’s 
reluctance to punish the apartheid government for its 
obstinacy—eroded faith that the U.N. could be an agent of 
social justice.  When taken together, these trends spelled 
trouble for the United States.  In the minds of many 
liberals, the intellectual infrastructure of American 
hegemony was buckling under the weight of postcolonial 
politics.  A new ‘status quo’ in South Africa would not 
only counteract these trends, but it would also help the 
United States reconsolidate its political authority in the 
decolonized world.  
The case at the International Court focused these 
abstract concerns in concrete ways.  As the State 
Department explained, the trial was ‘the first major 
confrontation between the world community and South Africa’ 
and a major challenge to the ‘authority of the U.N.’77  The 
Johnson administration’s overriding goal was to avoid the 
African bloc’s ‘all-or-nothing’ checkmate and prevent an 
angry explosion at the U.N. General Assembly.78  Assuming 
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that the ICJ judgment would go against South Africa on all 
counts, officials tried to preempt the consequences by 
mollifying the Nationalist government’s policies in South 
West Africa.  They adopted an aggressive tactical 
initiative.  Not only was the arms embargo of 1963 
continued, but the State Department began removing NASA and 
DOD facilities from South Africa and asked lending agencies 
to suspend economic activity with the Republic.79  On an 
informal level, Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen 
Williams and the African Bureau further coordinated a 
series of meetings with prominent businessmen to discourage 
investment in the Republic.80  Even the Pentagon got 
involved, canceling the U.S.S. Independence’s port call to 
Cape Town in May 1965.81  These efforts were coupled with a 
series of planning papers that explored the feasibility and 
desirability of economic sanctions and/or military action 
in southern Africa.82  By the end of the year, the United 
States—working in conjunction with Great Britain—was in the 
midst of a full-scale diplomatic battle with the Republic 
over the implementation of the Odendaal Report.83  This 
culminated with a pair of Aide-Mémoires in 1965 and 1966 
suggesting, with calculated subtlety, that the West would 
support economic sanctions if South African officials 
failed to comply with the ICJ decision.84  
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This turn of events surprised Pretoria.  Writing from 
Washington in 1965, ambassador Taswell speculated that the 
U.S. public was being ‘softened up’ for an attack on the 
Republic.  South Africa’s ‘most dangerous enemies’ were 
those out ‘to win the Negro vote in the United States and 
win the goodwill of the black man in Africa and the Afro-
Asian group as a whole.’  For these individuals, the ‘white 
man in Africa’ was merely an ‘expendable obstacle.’85  
Others pushed against such ‘over-simplified’ sentiments.  
‘The majority of the United States policy-making elements 
[are] not yet aware enough of the South African situation 
to have fixed views for or against,’ lectured Donald Sole, 
the Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs.  ‘In simple terms, 
we are not ‘Communists’ nor are we ‘Fascist’ enough (vide 
Franco) to be classified as ‘enemy.’’  There was still time 
to improve U.S.-South Africa relations.86  M.I. Botha, South 
Africa’s U.N. representative in the mid-1960s, agreed with 
this sentiment, but still felt the United States was guilty 
of ideological hubris.  The Americans, in his mind, were 
incapable of distinguishing ‘between the racial situation 
in the United States and that in South Africa.  To them 
nationhood is somehow only nationhood in the image of the 
United States which is an all-embracing nation—as Whitman 
called it, ‘a nation of nations.’’87   
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This intellectual egotism did not bode well for the 
Republic.  Nationalist officials were angered primarily by 
the United States’ unwillingness to acknowledge that the 
trial itself was tipping definitively in South Africa’s 
favor.  De Villiers spent much of 1965 burying the Court 
under documentary evidence and highlighting the 
implications and contradictions of Gross’s norm of ‘non-
discrimination’ and ‘non-separation.’  Turning the concept 
on the Republic’s enemies, he argued first that the 
internal policies of India, Liberia, Ethiopia, and dozens 
of other states in Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America 
fully supported ethnic, economic, religious, and racial 
stratification.  Although the ideal of ‘non-discrimination’ 
was rhetorically ubiquitous at the United Nations General 
Assembly, the concept still did not exist concretely 
anywhere in the world.88  Furthermore, if the Court accepted 
the logic of the Applicant’s accusation, it would open the 
door for infinite, unrestrained, and politically-charged 
litigation at the International Court.  Would 
‘untouchables’ in India be able to attack their government 
for its legacy of discrimination?  Were African Americans 
entitled to prosecute the United States for housing and 
employment segregation?  De Villiers did not provide 
answers to these questions, but his message was clear: 
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Human rights were not static, self-evident, or one-
dimensional.  They were fluid and subjective conceptual 
instruments used by actors with particular political 
agendas.   
The second part of de Villier’s counterattack tried to 
highlight the ‘true’ origins of Gross’s legal strategy.  
Drawing selectively on expert knowledge from Europe, South 
Africa, and the United States, South Africa’s lawyer 
presented a litany of witnesses to lament the 
‘indiscriminant use of racial discrimination, segregation, 
separation, apartheid, [and] Nazism’ at the General 
Assembly, and bemoan apartheid’s false association with 
racial superiority, doctrines of expansionism, and racial 
hatred.  Politics rather than ‘law and history’ were 
driving these linkages.89  Once de Villiers established this 
point, he turned his attention again to South Africa’s own 
policies.   Adeptly wrapping his country’s social program 
in the language of social science, he contrasted the 
African bloc’s ‘fairytale’ history of global unity with the 
Republic’s ‘judicious’ story of global diversity and 
separate development.90   
For de Villiers and his associates, the case climaxed 
in mid-October with the testimony of Dr. Stefan Possony, a 
professor of sociology from the Hoover Institution at 
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Stanford University.  In an exchange South African 
propagandists’ highlighted often after the judgment, the 
professor suggested that even if Gross’s norm existed, it 
could only be applied to inter-state relations, not the 
domestic policies of individual nations.91  Dr. Possony 
concluded by rejecting the philosophical underpinnings of 
the Applicant’s case: 
Mankind with all its diversities has never 
accepted a single writ.  To impose a single 
formula would be ideological imperialism.  Given 
the ideals of humanity—the hopes of advance as 
well as the promises of human rights—but given 
also a manifold reality, the best principle, it 
seems to me, is to tailor methods or responses to 
specific challenges. . . . As Hegel taught, 
reality is always reasonable in its own way.  
Reality can be changed, and of course it should 
be improved.  But continuity and respect for the 
historical tradition remain as the unavoidable 
framework of human betterment.92  
When South African politicians tried making this point 
directly to U.S. policymakers in the months before the 
Court’s verdict, they were met by indifference and 
hostility.  In a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State 
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G. Mennen Williams, ambassador Taswell was told that the 
‘sincerity’ of apartheid did not matter.  The Republic was 
‘sitting on a time-bomb and heading for a racial 
collision.’93  Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed 
similar sentiments in late 1965 in a discussion with South 
Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller.  
According to the American diplomat, everything turned on 
the fact that apartheid was alienating member-states at the 
United Nations.  ‘There may be differences between 
nations,’ he explained, ‘but the abandonment of the 
elementary structure would put civilization back about 500 
years—there would simply be no other channel of 
communication on the approach to differences.’  In 
referencing the ICJ decision, Rusk dismissed Muller’s 
contention that South Africa would win the case, and 
referred suggestively to a conversation he had had with a 
Russian official several years earlier.  ‘The law is like 
the tongue of a wagon,’ the Secretary of State explained.  
‘It goes in the direction in which it is pointed.’94   
 This mindset was internalised in Washington by mid-
1966.  In a National Security Council meeting on the eve of 
the Court’s decision, Undersecretary of State George Ball 
opened the conversation by speculating that the judges 
would rule against South Africa on all counts.  Although an 
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armed U.N. intervention was still unfathomable, the United 
States could not give ‘the black Africans the idea we are 
laying down, nor can we permit a breakdown of the 
International Court and the international legal system.’  
Debate erupted almost immediately on the utility of 
sanctions, with CIA Director Richard Helms and Treasury 
Secretary Henry Fowler suggesting that South Africa was 
‘one of the least vulnerable countries in the world’ to 
such action.  President Johnson, however, was less 
definitive.  He called for the establishment of a task 
force—ostensibly under the guidance of Arthur Goldberg—to 
plot a course to ‘relieve some of the pressure’ of the 
Court’s decision.  In typically colloquial terms, the 
President explained that ‘even a blind hog [could] find an 
acorn.’95   
Few observers were distracted by such euphemisms.  
Watching the situation from Europe, British officials 
summarized, ‘It is almost inconceivable that the Americans 
would be prepared to cast their first veto in favour of the 
White man in Southern Africa, let alone veto an attempt to 
uphold the rule of law which had been flouted by the White 
minority.’96  If the Applicants successfully obtained a 
rationale for sanctions under article 94 of the U.N. 
Charter, in other words, the United States would be 
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obliged—in some ways even forced—to support action against 
South Africa.  Just as Gross had envisioned, the United 
States would be in a political checkmate. 
 There was only one catch—the Court’s final judgment.  
After seven months of deliberations and five years of 
litigation, this ruling came finally on 18 July 1966.  With 
the world watching in anticipation, the ICJ unveiled a 
startling eight-to-seven decision.97   According to the 
Court’s new majority, the Applicants no longer had 
sufficient ‘legal right or interest’ in the South West 
Africa Mandate to obtain a judgment on the merits of their 
case.  ‘Humanitarian considerations can constitute the 
inspirational basis for rules of law,’ the Court explained, 
but unless given ‘jurisdictional expression’ and ‘clothed 
in legal form,’ it was impossible for them to ‘generate 
legal rights and obligations.’98  The African bloc’s 
arguments, in this regard, were ‘based on considerations of 
an extra-legal character, the product of after-knowledge’ 
more suited for the political realm than the legal system.99  
It was not the job of the Court to ‘fill in the gaps’ of 
international law.100  This decision not only reversed the 
logic, content, and implications of the Court’s 1962 
ruling; it shattered the idea that the Court would act as 
an agent of transitional justice and teleological history.   
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The ruling stunned African nationalist leaders.  In 
the days that followed countries around the continent 
reacted with visceral anger.  Ghana’s U.N. ambassador 
summarized the mindset in late July, saying that the Court 
was so ‘out of tune with the tempo of [the] modern world’ 
that African countries would never again acknowledge its 
‘jurisdiction’ or ‘authority.’101  In testimony before U.S. 
Congress in August, Gross lamented that the decision had 
‘introduced a new element of uncertainty into international 
adjudication at a time when predictable and systematic 
legal order needs to be established.’  So long as the 
judges were ‘pro-Western and [bound] to international law 
which is essentially European,’ Third World countries would 
resist and question the power of the Court.102  In commentary 
that foreshadowed the events of the early 1970s, the New 
York Times said, ‘The decision on South-West Africa may 
appear to [African states] to confirm the growing suspicion 
that if Black Africa is to get help against South Africa . 
. . it must look to the Communist bloc.’103 
In Pretoria, officials looked at the judgment with 
measured ebullience.  In a formal statement to the 
international community, Prime Minister Verwoerd declared 
sanctimoniously that the Republic would ‘not crow over 
[its] opponents,’ even though ‘impartial observers’ had 
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determined their claims of oppression to be ‘unfounded.’  
The ‘door of friendship’ would be left open, but he warned 
that ‘intervention in each others affairs’ would benefit no 
one and lectured that ‘world peace’ would come only through 
economic development, not ‘jealousy, interference and 
conflict.’104  A secret briefing paper further elaborated on 
these points in early August. ‘It has always been clear 
that the main purpose of the promoters of the South West 
Africa case was to obtain a Judgment in contentious 
proceedings, which if not complied with, could lead to an 
invocation of Article 94 of the Charter,’ the authors 
explained. ‘Our adversaries have consequently not succeeded 
in obtaining a basis for invoking Article 94 of the 
Charter.  This is probably the most significant effect of 
the Judgment.’  Although the political game between the 
African bloc and South Africa would continue at the General 
Assembly, the possibility of legal recourse was 
‘definitively shut-down.’  The situation had returned to 
‘pre-1960 conditions.’105 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Scholars of international law have debated the wisdom 
of Gross’s legal strategy for over four decades.  Few have 
been kind.106  However, much of the criticism glosses over 
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the historical exigencies facing the New York lawyer and 
his compatriots in the mid-1960s.  The establishment of a 
human rights regime after World War II created a unique 
space for the initiatives of Third World actors in the 
years surrounding decolonisation.  Framed in universalistic 
terms, the discourse of human rights rationalized the 
demands of the global south and created a world where 
European colonialism was no longer conceptually 
sustainable.  The ICJ case was both a microcosm of this 
process and a turning point in its history.  It was the 
moment when the marriage between human rights, development, 
and political freedom was put to the test in a court of 
international law.  Gross’s case may have marked a radical 
shift in legal theory, but his approach was tied intimately 
to a much broader movement unfolding in the years before 
and after decolonisation.   
In the wake of the Court’s decision, this story 
changed in dramatic ways.  Anti-apartheid activism at the 
United Nations grew more ubiquitous but less influential in 
the late 1960s.  Having failed to secure a victory in the 
legal realm, African nationalists refocused their energies 
on the political arena, rallying behind a series of U.N. 
General Assembly resolutions that superficially terminated 
the Mandate and renamed the territory Namibia.  The 
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Security Council—particularly Great Britain and the United 
States—refused to take action.  Faced with this impasse 
(again), African nationalism crumbled in the late 1960s, 
both as a political movement and as an international 
discourse.  Although anti-apartheid activism continued to 
mobilise an array of liberals, civil rights activists, and 
church leaders in the years to come, the clarity that 
marked the struggle in the years surrounding decolonisation 
fractured.  As these trends became more obvious, liberation 
groups like the African National Congress (ANC) and the 
South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) turned away 
from their ineffectual patrons at the Organization of 
African Unity and moved slowly into the communist sphere of 
influence.  By the time the Portuguese colonies finally 
collapsed in the mid-1970s, southern Africa was no longer 
the symbolic epicenter of the decolonisation struggle but 
merely one more battleground in the larger Cold War between 
the United States and the Soviet Union.   
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